

























Dynamics of Output Growth, Consumption and Physical Capital 


















Department of Economics and Related Studies 
University of York 
Heslington 




Valuation  of the Firm’s Liabilities 




Marco Realdon VALUATION OF THE FIRM￿ S LIABILITIES
WHEN EQUITY HOLDERS ARE ALSO
CREDITORS
(Paper version after second revision for Journal




This paper presents a tractable structural model whereby controlling
equity holders are also among the creditors of the ￿rm. As the ￿rm ap-
proaches distress, equity holders can depauperate the ￿rm and expropriate
other creditors by repaying their credit before bankruptcy. The bank-
ruptcy court￿ s right to revoke such repayment protects arm￿ s length cred-
itors, reduces the cost of borrowing and induces equity holders to antici-
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1pate repayment of their credit. Equity holders decide repayment neither
too early nor too late, so as to reduce the risk of repayment revocation
by the bankruptcy court. Similar conclusions apply to the preferential
repayment of bank loans personally guaranteed by equity holders. The
analysis also suggests that callable bearer bonds may be more valuable to
equity holders than to other creditors.
Key words: equity holders￿ s credit, debt repayment, assets liquidation,
revocatoria, debt valuation, default, structural model.
JEL classi￿cation: G13;G33.
1 Introduction
Controlling equity holders of closely held private companies often lend to the
very ￿rm they own. For example Gelter (2005) studies this phenomenon in
the US and in various European jurisdictions. Alternatively equity holders
often o⁄er personal guarantees to banks that concede loans to the ￿rm they
control. The accounting profession in Europe and US is familiar with these
phenomena, which are often motivated by the quest for tax savings. In fact
loans and loan guarantees given by equity holders increase leverage and in this
way they are often instrumental to reducing the total tax burden on the ￿rm
and on the equity holders themselves. For example, Miller (1977) discussed
the potential tax savings obtainable through equity holders￿loans in the US
setting. Cheris (1970) analysed the legal quali￿cation and tax implications of
equity holders￿loans and the related thin-capitalisation rules. Indeed the US and
2many European countries envisage thin-capitalisation rules in order to counter
the abuse of leverage for the purpose of tax avoidance, since leverage allows
the ￿rm to deduct interest charges from its taxable pro￿t. Tax avoiding high
leverage is typically achieved precisely through loans given by equity holders
or through bank loans guaranteed by equity holders, since third party lenders
would often not be willing to lend to extremely levered ￿rms.
On the other hand this paper argues that, let alone tax considerations, equity
holders￿loans and guarantees can harm arm￿ s-length creditors. As the ￿rm
approaches ￿nancial distress, it may repay equity holders￿loan at face value,
possibly by selling part of its assets, thus e⁄ectively making equity holders￿loan
senior to the claim of the other creditors. Hereafter we refer to this action as
"repayment". The sale of assets and repayment would depauperate the ￿rm and
make default more likely. Equity holders would receive the face value of their
loan, which, in the proximity of distress, would typically exceed the fair value
of that same loan in the absence of repayment. Of course repayment would be
detrimental to arm￿ s length creditors, since it would reduce the amount of assets
to satisfy their claims. Hence arm￿ s length creditors are exposed to "repayment
risk".
"Repayment risk" is a risk well know to bankruptcy courts and legislators. In
order to protect creditors￿interests, the bankruptcy codes of the US and most
European countries envisage speci￿c rules to avert extreme cases of debtor￿ s
misconduct of the type just described. For simplicity we mainly consider the
rules of the US bankruptcy code (USC) and Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act as
3points of reference. For example, sections 547-548 of USC address "preferences"
and fraudulent transfers, which encompass "repayment" as above de￿ned. Pref-
erences regard the preferential treatment of some creditors and consist in the
repayment or concession of privileges to some creditors to the detriment of other
creditors. Fraudulent transfers consist of a variety of fraudulent ways in which
the debtor can hide assets from the grab of creditors when bankruptcy is immi-
nent. In order to void preferences and fraudulent transfers, the U.S. code gives
bankruptcy trustees "avoiding powers". The exercise of such avoiding powers
is intended to recuperate the assets that the debtor has "conveyed" outside the
reach of creditors. In particular section 547 of USC gives the trustee the right
to avoid repayments of loans to controlling equity holders, who are quali￿ed as
insiders, that took place within one year of bankruptcy ￿ling. Gelter (2005)
reports similar rules in Germany, Austria and Italy, whereby equity holders￿ s
loans are treated as equity by the bankruptcy court, at least when the loan was
given in the relative proximity of distress.
Also repayments of bank loans personally guaranteed by controlling equity
holders can be voided, which is of course a concern to the banking sector. For a
U.S. example, Cullina (1991) and Brandt (1989) support such judicial decisions.
Cullina explains how such repayments should be classi￿ed as cases of fraudulent
conveyance. The rationale is that the equity holders￿personal guarantee makes
the personal assets of equity holders available to creditors in addition to the
￿rm￿assets. Thus repaying the guaranteed bank loan eliminates the equity
holders￿personal obligation to honour the guarantee they have conceded to the
4bank, with the indirect e⁄ect of decreasing the total pool of assets available for
creditors. This judicial orientation entails that the analysis of equity holders￿
loans can be extended to bank loans personally guaranteed by equity holders,
as is shown later on in the paper.
This paper analyses a tractable structural model of credit risk that hinges on
"repayment risk" and that reveals a number of points. First, a potent deterrent
against "repayment risk" is the bankruptcy court￿ s or the bankruptcy trustee￿ s
right to avoid and revoke repayments to equity holders that took place prior
to bankruptcy ￿ling. The possible exercise of avoiding powers protects arm￿ s
length creditors, reduces the cost of borrowing and induces equity holders to
anticipate repayment, so as to distance the time of repayment from the time
of bankruptcy ￿ling. In fact, as a necessary condition for the exercise of the
bankruptcy trustee￿ s avoiding powers, bankruptcy codes normally require that
repayment precede bankruptcy ￿ling by not more than one or two years.
Second, in the absence of avoiding powers the earlier the repayment is, the
less detrimental it is to the ￿rm￿ s arm￿ s length creditors. Instead it is in the
interest of equity holders to delay repayment. But in the presence of avoiding
powers equity holders decide repayment neither too early nor too late, in order
to reduce excessive exposure to the risk of avoiding powers. The tax shield
associated with the debt held by equity holders does not materially a⁄ect the
repayment decision.
Third, the analysis of repayment risk is applicable not only to loans which
equity holders concede to the ￿rm, but also to callable bonds and callable con-
5vertible bonds held by equity holders, to callable preferred stock held by equity
holders and even to injections of funds from equity holders into the ￿rm that
neither command any interest nor oblige the ￿rm to repayment. "Repayment
risk" is especially high when the ￿rm has issued bearer callable bonds, which
equity holders may anonymously buy at above market prices, because the bonds
would be more valuable to themselves than to anybody else. Finally the analysis
is applicable also to bank loans personally guaranteed by equity holders. The
repayment policy of such loans is similar to that of equity holders￿loans, since
even such repayments could be voided by bankruptcy trustees.
1.1 Other related literature
This paper is motivated by the fact that the bankruptcy law literature has
long recognised and analysed preferences, fraudulent conveyance and avoiding
powers, but the ￿nance literature has kept almost mute on the topic with rare
exceptions. Hence the contribution of this paper to the ￿nance literature con-
sists in assessing how bankruptcy code provisions concerning preferences and
fraudulent conveyance a⁄ect the prices of liabilities as well as capital structure
decisions.
As for the legal literature, Rose-Ackerman (1985, p. 951) long predicted
that, in the absence of appropriate code provisions, "the volume of loans would
be ine¢ ciently low and interest rates ine¢ ciently high to take account of this
possibility of hiding assets from creditors." The analysis of this paper to some
extent supports this conclusion.
6As for the economics literature, Gelter (2005) studied the social welfare
e⁄ects of the subordination of controlling equity holders￿loans in bankruptcy, a
provision envisaged in both continental Europe and the US, which goes under
the name of "equitable subordination". Gelter concentrates on loans given by
equity holders to the ￿rm when the ￿rm is already in the relative proximity of
￿nancial distress. He stresses that such loans can represent rescue attempts and
that equity subordination can discourage not only ine¢ cient rescue attempts,
but also e¢ cient ones.
Heaton (2000) showed how fraudulent conveyance laws improve ￿rms￿debt
capacity and cost of borrowing. This papers di⁄ers from Heaton￿ s since it con-
centrates on loans and guarantees given by controlling equity holders and since
the analysis hinges on arbitrage pricing of the ￿rm￿ s liabilities. Also Bond
and Krishnamurthy (2004) stress the importance of bankruptcy rules address-
ing fraudulent conveyance for the proper regulation and functioning of credit
markets.
This article is also close in spirit to Morellec￿ s (2001). Morellec assumes that,
as the ￿rm￿ s prospects worsen, the ￿rm￿ s assets are progressively liquidated and
the proceeds are distributed to equity holders. Such liquidations progressively
erode the collateral value of the ￿rm to the detriment of creditors. Also in this
paper the ￿rm￿ s assets are liquidated, although not progressively as in Morellec,
but the proceeds are speci￿cally used to repay debt held by equity holders, which
is again detrimental to other creditors. Notice that if, as in Morellec, equity
holders did not hold any debt, it may be di¢ cult or impossible for the ￿rm to
7distribute the assets sales proceeds to equity holders: there may not be enough
reserves of retained earnings to distribute, especially when the ￿rm approaches
distress, or debt covenants may limit the distribution of dividends, and reduction
of share capital is often seen with suspicion by the courts especially when the
￿rm approaches distress. Instead repayment of debt held by equity holders does
not pose any of these limitations and seems an e⁄ective way for equity holders
to distribute some of the ￿rm￿ s wealth to themselves even if the ￿rm approaches
default. In the absence of repayment the market value of the equity holders￿
loan would typically be below face value. But repayment is e⁄ected at face
value, which would amount to a gift from the ￿rm to equity holders in so far
as face value exceeds market value in the absence of repayment. On the other
hand debt repayment may be revoked by the bankruptcy court, as discussed
later. These features distinguish the present contribution from Morellec￿ s.
Most model assumptions in this article follow Goldstein-Ju-Leland (2001):
in particular the building block of the analysis is the before-tax value of the
￿rm, so that the tax advantage of the equity holders￿loan is properly modelled.
The paper is organised as follows. The next two sections illustrate the model
with and without repayment. Then another section explores the model predic-
tions and yet another section generalises the analysis. Finally the analysis is
extended to the repayment of guaranteed bank loans and then the conclusions
are drawn.
82 The model without repayment
This section introduces the model, which follows the tradition of contingent
claims analysis and structural models. Assume that, under universal risk neu-
trality, the value of the ￿rm￿ s assets V follows the process
dV = V (r ￿ b)dt + V ￿dz (1)
where r is the default-free interest rate, which is is assumed constant, b is the
rate at which the ￿rm generates EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes), ￿ is
the volatility parameter and dz is the di⁄erential of a Wiener process. Following
Goldstein-Ju-Leland (2001), V is the before-tax value of the ￿rm, to be divided
among debt holders, equity holders and the Government tax claim. Let tc
denote the corporate tax rate. Assume that all net earnings produced by the
￿rm are immediately distributed to equity holders and that dividends enjoy no
tax credit, rather equity holders need to pay a dividend withholding tax at the
rate td. This assumption acknowledges the trend of European countries away
from dividend tax credits and towards taxation of dividends. Moreover it is not
inconsistent to assume that all net earnings are distributed, even if distributions
entail a sort of double taxation. Of course this is true as long as such double
taxation is not extreme and the reason is that equity value, as is typical of this
type of models, rises if net earnings are distributed as soon as possible. It follows
that the after-tax value of the un-levered ￿rm is V (1 ￿ tc)(1 ￿ td).
9The balance sheet equation of the levered ￿rm is
V = E (V ) + T (V ) + D(V ) + Ds (V ) + B (V ) (2)
where E (V ) is the value of equity, T (V ) is the value of total future taxes to be
paid by the ￿rm and by equity holders, D(V ) is the value of debt not held by
equity holders, Ds (V ) is the value of debt held by equity holders and B (V ) is
the value of future possible bankruptcy costs. D(V ) continuously pays coupons
at the yearly rate c and has face value F. D(V ) can be thought of as a bank
loan of inde￿nite or very long maturity, or a bank loan that is periodically
"rolled-over". Ds (V ) continuously pays coupons at the yearly rate cs and has
face value Fs. Following Kim-Ramaswamy-Sundaresan (1993), Fan-Sundaresan
(2000) and others, default and bankruptcy are triggered by a "liquidity" con-
dition: default takes place as soon as V drops to the barrier level Vdd = c+cs
b .
Bankruptcy follows default. Bankruptcy costs are a proportion a of Vdd, so
the ￿rm can be sold for an after-tax rescue value of Vdd (1 ￿ a)(1 ￿ tc)(1 ￿ td).
Notice that those who buy the ￿rm would just be willing to pay for the after-tax
value of the ￿rm. According to a widespread judicial orientation, reported for
example in Gelter (2005), in bankruptcy D(V ) is regarded as senior to Ds (V ),
despite the lack of explicit subordination covenants. Gelter reports that courts,
both in US and Europe, typically tend to treat equity holders￿loans as equity
and thus as subordinated to those of arm￿ s length creditors. Hence the recovery
10values of the debt claims are respectively
D(Vdd) = min(Vdd (1 ￿ a)(1 ￿ tc)(1 ￿ td);F) (3)
Ds (Vdd) = min(max(Vdd (1 ￿ a)(1 ￿ tc)(1 ￿ td) ￿ F;0);Fs): (4)
The ￿rm continuously produces EBIT at rate V bdt, and such earnings are di-
vided as follows:
- cdt is the interest gross of withholding tax paid on D(V ), i.e. paid to
creditors other than equity holders;
- cs (1 ￿ ti)dt is the interest on Ds (V ) paid to equity holders net of with-
holding tax, whose rate is ti;
- cstidt is the withholding tax on interest paid to equity holders;
- (V b ￿ c ￿ cs)(1 ￿ tc)(1 ￿ td)dt are the dividends paid out to equity holders
net of corporate tax and the dividend withholding tax;
- (V b ￿ c ￿ cs)tcdt is the corporate tax;
- (V b ￿ c ￿ cs)(1 ￿ tc)tddt is the dividend withholding tax.
Worth emphasising is that T (V ) is the present value of the total tax pay-
ments due by the ￿rm and by the equity holders, i.e. the present value of the
cash ￿ ow stream equal to
[(V b ￿ c ￿ cs)(tc + (1 ￿ tc)td) + csti]dt (5)
over any in￿nitesimal period dt until default takes place. In this setting the
absence of arbitrage opportunities allows us to derive the formulae for E (V ),
11D(V ), Ds (V ), T (V ) and B (V ) that are reported in Appendix A.1. In the next
section the current setting is enriched with the main new feature of this paper:
before default the ￿rm repays the debt held by equity holders by selling part of
its assets. We refer to this event as "repayment".
3 The model with repayment
We now consider the same model as before, but for the right of equity hold-
ers to deliberate repayment of Ds (V ), which is the debt held by themselves.
Repayment is assumed to be optimally decided by equity holders as soon as V
drops to the level V ￿, where we impose the condition that V ￿ > Vdd in order for
repayment to precede default. This condition is needed as it becomes binding
when liquidation costs are negligible and repayment cannot be revoked by the
court, although in other cases imposing that V ￿ > Vdd is redundant because of
the way equity holders will optimally set V ￿. We will determine V ￿ later. Upon
repayment Ds (V ) is reimbursed at face value Fs. In order to secure the liquidity
to repay Fs, the ￿rm needs to liquidate a part of its assets, whose before-tax and
before-liquidation value we denote as x. Thus liquidation of assets causes V ￿ to
drop to V ￿ ￿ x. Liquidation of assets entails liquidation costs proportional to
x, which we denote with kx, where 0 ￿ k ￿ 1 is a constant. Moreover those
who buy the part of the assets that are liquidated, would only be willing to
pay the after-tax value of such assets net of liquidation costs, which amounts to
x(1 ￿ k)(1 ￿ tc)(1 ￿ td). Then x, which is the before-tax and before-liquidation
12amount of assets to sell in order to enable the ￿rm to repay Fs, must be such
that
Fs = x(1 ￿ k)(1 ￿ tc)(1 ￿ td) (6)
giving x = Fs
(1￿k)(1￿tc)(1￿td). In the setting of this section, before repayment the
￿rm￿ s balance sheet equation is
V = E (V ) + T (V ) + D(V ) + Ds (V ) + B (V ) + L(V ) (7)
where L(V ) is the present value of liquidation costs kx induced by repayment.
After repayment the balance sheet equation becomes
V = E0 (V ) + T
0
(V ) + D0 (V;￿) ￿ R(V;￿) + B0 (V ). (8)
where the superscripts denote claim values after repayment. R(V;￿) is the
value of the bankruptcy court￿ s right to revoke the repayment of Fs before
default and bankruptcy. ￿ denotes the time period left until the last day on
which declaration of bankruptcy would enable the court to revoke repayment of
Fs. The term ￿R(V;￿) in the above balance sheet equation signi￿es a potential
liability for equity holders, who have received repayment of their credit, but
may have to return such payment to the bankruptcy trustee due to the trustee￿ s
avoiding powers. The trustee would then use the sum thus recuperated to pay
arm￿ s length creditors. Correspondingly the value of the claim of arm￿ s length
13creditors D0 (V;￿) increases by R(V;￿) after repayment. The possible exercise
of avoiding powers will be critical in the analysis to follow.
Thus repayment of Fs can be revoked through the trustee￿ s avoiding powers,
even if such repayment took place before the bankruptcy date. The bankruptcy
courts of the US and European countries typically envisage similar avoiding
powers aimed at protecting the interest of the mass of creditors against detri-
mental acts of the debtor previous to bankruptcy or against acts in violation
of the equal treatment of all creditors. Pursuant to the exercise of avoiding
powers equity holders would give back Fs to the ￿rm and concur with the other
creditors for the satisfaction of their claim in bankruptcy. Hereafter we denote
with ￿o the value of ￿ at the time of repayment. Typically 0 ￿ ￿o ￿ 2 meaning
that avoiding powers typically apply to repayments that precede the bankruptcy
declaration date by more than two years.
We notice that, to rule out arbitrage opportunities, we need to impose the
following conditions at the moment of repayment
14V ￿ = E (V ￿) + T (V ￿) + D(V ￿) + B (V ￿) + L(V ￿) (9)
E (V ￿) = E0 (V ￿ ￿ x) (10)
T (V ￿) = T0 (V ￿ ￿ x) + x(1 ￿ k)(tc + (1 ￿ tc)td) (11)
D(V ￿) = D0 (V ￿ ￿ x;￿o) (12)
Ds (V ￿) = Fs ￿ R(V ￿ ￿ x;￿o) (13)
B (V ￿) = B0 (V ￿ ￿ x) (14)
L(V ￿) = kx (15)
Conditions 10 and 12 state that the values of equity and of the arm￿ s length
credit before repayment must be the same as those after repayment at the very
time of repayment. Condition 11 states a similar condition for the tax claim,
while accounting for the fact that repayment entails a reduction in the debt
induced tax shield and hence an increase in the value of the tax claim equal
to x(1 ￿ k)(tc + (1 ￿ tc)td). Condition 13 states that at V ￿ the value of debt
held by equity holders is equal to its face value, since such debt is reimbursed,
minus the value of the court￿ s right to revoke such reimbursement should the
￿rm ￿le for bankruptcy no later than ￿o years since the date of reimbursement.
Condition 14 states that at V ￿ the value of potential bankruptcy costs before
repayment approaches the value of potential bankruptcy costs after repayment.
Repayment causes the value of the ￿rm￿ s assets to drop from V ￿ to V ￿ ￿x and
hence it a⁄ects the probability of default and the value of potential bankruptcy
15costs. Equation states that at V ￿ the ￿rm incurs costs equal to kx due to the
partial liquidation of the ￿rm￿ s assets. These conditions imply that
V ￿￿x = E0 (V ￿ ￿ x)+T
0
(V ￿ ￿ x)+D0 (V ￿ ￿ x;￿o)￿R(V ￿ ￿ x;￿o)+B0 (V ￿ ￿ x).
(16)
When repayment is possible, the above conditions and the absence of arbitrage
opportunities also imply that E (V ), T (V ), D(V ), Ds (V ), B (V ) and L(V )
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After repayment R(V;￿) represents a potential liability for equity holders and
a potential asset for the other creditors. In fact R(V;￿) is the present value of a
claim that pays o⁄ if only if V drops to the post-repayment default barrier level
Vd within ￿o years of the repayment date. In such event, the bankruptcy code
16retrospectively assimilated repayment to either a preference of as fraudulent con-
veyance and requires that equity holders need to pay back to arm￿ s length cred-
itors an amount equal to the minimum between the repayment amount Fs and
the loss su⁄ered by arm￿ s length creditors max(F ￿ Vd (1 ￿ a)(1 ￿ tc)(1 ￿ td);0).
In other words, it is as if, in case of default soon after repayment, equity holders
had to pay arm￿ s length creditors the amount
R(Vd) = min(max(F ￿ Vd (1 ￿ a)(1 ￿ tc)(1 ￿ td);0);Fs): (20)
Thus, after repayment, the claim R(V;￿) satis￿es, over the region [Vd;1[ ￿











V (r ￿ b) ￿ rR (21)
R(V ! 1) ! 0
R(Vd) = min(max(F ￿ Vd (1 ￿ a)(1 ￿ tc)(1 ￿ td);0);Fs)
R(￿ = 0) = 0.
Notice that after repayment the default barrier is Vd = c
b, unlike Vdd = c+cs
b in
the absence of repayment as in the previous section. R(Vd) is the payo⁄ to the
claim R(V;￿) due to the exercise of the bankruptcy trustee￿ s avoiding powers.
It is the amount that, after repayment, equity holders need to pay back to other
creditors in case of bankruptcy.
17The expression for R(Vd) does not consider that, if avoiding powers are
exercised, equity holders have the right to concur with other creditors to satisfy
their claim, since such claim is subordinated to others creditors and virtually
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We are left with the problem of how to determine V ￿, which represents the
optimal repayment policy.
3.1 The optimal policy
We assume that equity holders choose V ￿ so as to maximise the total value of
their claims E (V ) + Ds (V ), even though scrupulous equity holders may not
follow this policy since it is detrimental to other creditors. Then equity holders
will also ensure that repayment does not precipitate immediate default, which
would force them to immediately give Fs back to the ￿rm. This imposes the
19constraint V ￿ ￿ x > Vd.
Equity holders cannot deliberate repayment if default has already taken
place. This imposes the further constraint V ￿ > Vdd, where Vdd is the default
barrier in case of no repayment. Finally it can be shown that equity holders
will decide repayment only if V ￿ is at or below the current level V , i.e. only
if V ￿ ￿ V , else they would have already decided to repay their loan or would
not have lent in the ￿rst place. These considerations suggest that the optimal
repayment policy is represented by V ￿ such that
max
V ￿ [E (V ) + Ds (V )] (27)
st : V ￿ ￿ x > Vd;V ￿ > Vdd;V ￿ ￿ V:
Thus we can only ￿nd V ￿ numerically though a non-linear optimisation algo-
rithm. Next we explore the model predictions when V ￿ is determined as just
described.
4 Comparative statics and model predictions
Comparative statics reveal a number of points. To focus the arguments, we
assume a base case scenario with average realistic parameters as illustrated
in Table 1. Input parameter values (in Italic) are similar to those typically
recurring in papers on structural models of credit risk.
20[Table 1 about here]
4.1 The case of no repayment
The ￿rst column of Table 1 illustrates the case whereby equity holders are not
repaid their credit. Assuming that V = 100, equity value is E (V ) = 31:5, the
tax claim is worth T (V ) = 29:5 and the debt claim held by equity holders is
worth Ds (V ) = 13:1, which is far less than its face value of Fs = 25, since
Ds (V ) recovers nothing in case of default, i.e. since Ds (Vdd) = 0.
An unreported simulation shows that, if cs = 0 and Fs = 0 and all else is
still as assumed in the ￿rst column, then equity value becomes E (V ) = 43:5 <
(31:5 + 13:1) and the tax claim rises to T (V ) = 32:5. This means that equity
holders are better o⁄ lending to their ￿rm even if they do not get repaid either
before or after the ￿rm￿ s default. The reason is that lending enables the ￿rm to
save cstc of corporate tax and equity holders to save cs (1 ￿ tc)td of dividend tax
even though they have to pay tax on coupons equal to csti. This entails a tax
saving as long as cs (tc + (1 ￿ tc)td ￿ ti) > 0, as it had long been recognised by
Miller (1977). Such tax savings are a real possibility in some jurisdictions, even
though thin-capitalisation and similar tax rules often tend to limit the amount
cs that the ￿rm can deduce for corporate tax purposes. Hence, especially when
banks refuse cheap loans because of the ￿rm￿ s already high leverage, equity
holders￿lending may be motivated by the quest for tax savings. This can be
the case irrespective of the repayment decision that we consider next.
214.2 The case of repayment
The second column of Table 1 shows the value of the ￿rm￿ s liabilities if, all
else as in the ￿rst column, equity holders are repaid their loan at face value
as soon as the ￿rm￿ s value drops to V ￿ = 68:9. Ceteris paribus repayment
clearly makes equity holders better o⁄: Ds (V ) rises from 13:1 to 25:2 and
E (V ) decreases from 31:5 to 22:1. At the same time D(V ) decreases from 22:6
to 17 and T (V ) rises from 29:5 to 33:8. This means that, if equity holders
are expected to deliberate repayment of their own loan, the credit spread on
D(V ) rises from 1:53% (without repayment) to 3:34% (with repayment) while
the credit spread on Ds (V ) drops from 5:53% (without repayment) to 0:97%
(with repayment). Thus repayment at V ￿ transfers value from D(V ) and E (V )
to Ds (V ) and T (V ). Ds (V ) rises because, whereas in the absence of repayment
Ds (V ) is subordinated to D(V ) and recovers nothing in bankruptcy, repayment
at V ￿ e⁄ectively makes Ds (V ) senior to D(V ) and practically default-free,
even though the possible exercise of the trustee￿ s avoiding powers mitigates this
conclusion. Equity holders￿ s loan is repaid at face value, which ceteris paribus
is usually much higher than the loan market value under the assumption of no
repayment. Repayment would then entail a gift from the ￿rm to equity holders.
Unscrupulous equity holders would thus have the option to expropriate other
creditors by making a gift to themselves: such option is optimally exercised at
V ￿ = 68:9.
This example highlights the general result that repayment harms arm￿ s
length creditors and increases the cost of borrowing. This conclusion is some-
22how mitigated by the fact that repayment would also decrease the default barrier
from Vdd = c+cs
b to Vd = c
b. This a⁄ect somewhat alleviates default risk.
The prospect of repayment also raises the "expected tax bill" T (V ), since
repayment reduces leverage and the tax shield associated with leverage. When
assets worth x are sold at V ￿ for a net realised price of x(1 ￿ k)(1 ￿ tc)(1 ￿ td),
the sold assets are debt-free and for simplicity we do not consider the possibility
that the asset buyer may increase its leverage to reduce its own tax burden.
Then at V ￿ the Government is thought to receive x(1 ￿ k)(tc + (1 ￿ tc)td).
The reason why we abstract from the buyer￿ s option to increase his leverage
and tax shield is that the buyer should only be willing to pay for the after-tax
value of assets. Thus our estimates of all claim values, apart from T (V ), would
not be a⁄ected if the buyer increased his leverage and tax shield after purchasing
the assets.
4.2.1 Optimal repayment
We note that, in order for repayment at V ￿ not to trigger immediate default,
which would again make Ds (V ) subordinated to D(V ), we need to impose that
V ￿ ￿ x > Vd, which in our case means 68:9 ￿ 42:6 > 15:6. Simulations show
that generally such constraint is met if ￿o > 0 and that lim￿o!0 (V ￿ ￿ x) ! Vd.
Thus, if the trustee￿ s avoiding powers cannot be exercised, for example because
the bankruptcy code does not envisage them, equity holders will tend to repay
their loan as late as possible, i.e. just before V drops to the level x+Vd. Instead,
if the trustee￿ s avoiding powers can be exercised, equity holders will decide to
23repay earlier. This point is now further explained.
In the absence of avoiding powers equity holders tend to repay as late as
possible. In fact we can view equity holders￿decision as one of minimising the
value of the arm￿ s length credit D(V ), because, as V ￿ decreases, E (V ) rises
and D(V ) drops: what equity holders may gain through later repayment is
associated with a loss to arm￿ s length creditors and vice versa. The lower V ￿ is,
the lower is D(V ), in the absence of avoiding powers, hence equity holders will
tend to repay their credit as late as possible, i.e. when V ￿ = x+Vd. This point
is con￿rmed by inspection of equation 23. In fact, if ￿ = 0, then R(V;￿) = 0
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be maximised subject to the mentioned constraint. The economic
intuition behind this result is that repayment entails a transfer of value from
arm￿ s length creditors to equity holders, and such transfer of value is greater
if repayment is carried out when D(V ) is more sensitive to a change in the
level of assets V . And of course as V decreases
@D(V )
@V rises, so that the later
repayment is set the greater the mentioned value transfer is. Notice also that,
24in order for V ￿ not to a⁄ect D(V ), we would need to impose that x = fV ￿,
where f is an arbitrary constant. We conclude that in the absence of avoiding
powers unscrupulous equity holders would be tempted to increase equity value
by delaying repayment of their own loan as much as possible.
In the presence of avoiding powers equity holders will not delay repayment
as much and V ￿ becomes an interior point. The reason is that the exercise of
avoiding powers becomes more unlikely as V ￿ rises, which means that R(V;￿)
decreases in V ￿, and this entails that D(V ) may decrease as well as increase in
V ￿ as shown in Figure 1 for the base case scenario in the presence of avoiding
powers. Similarly in the presence of avoiding powers Ds (V ) may increase as
well as decrease in V ￿ as shown in Figure 2 again for the base case scenario.
Clearly there is a value of V ￿ than maximises Ds (V ) and one that minimises
D(V ) and the two a quite close.
[Figures 1 and 2 about here]
Figures 1 and 2 show that D(V ) is much more sensitive to V ￿ than Ds (V )
is. This entails that, since the optimal value of V ￿ involves a trade-o⁄ be-
tween minimising D(V ) and maximising Ds (V ), equity holders chose optimal
repayment by primarily trying to minimise the value of the arm￿ s length credit
rather than by maximising the value of their loan. Put it another way the op-
timal value of V ￿ involves a trade-o⁄ for equity holders between maximising
Ds (V ) and maximising E (V ), and equity holders will decide repayment mainly
to maximise E (V ), which is much more sensitive to V ￿ than Ds (V ) is.
We may expect a second e⁄ect determining V ￿: earlier repayment reduces
25the tax shield for the ￿rm and equity holders when
tc + (1 ￿ tc)td ￿ ti > 0:
In particular, as the interest withholding tax rate ti decreases, the tax shield due
to the equity holders￿loan rises and V ￿ should decrease, since repayment entails
foregoing a more valuable tax shield. But simulations reveal that V ￿ hardly rises
as ti decreases. Thus tax rules do not seem e⁄ective to induce earlier repayment.
This highlights that the tax shield is of second order importance for the optimal
repayment policy, even though the equity holders￿loan may have been originally
motivated by tax-avoidance.
V ￿ is hardly sensitive to cs. Ceteris paribus V ￿ moves from 69:93 in the
base case, whereby cs = 5% and r = 4%, to 70:38 when cs = 0. In other words
V ￿ hardly moves even if equity holders cut coupons to zero. This may seem
puzzling, but the main reason is that, even if cs = 0, equity holders do not lose
that much since what they lose in terms of foregone interest they receive back
in terms of correspondingly higher dividends (net of taxes). Thus lending at
no interest will hardly make equity holders more impatient to be repaid. Hence
controlling equity holders may want to lend to their own ￿rms even without
requiring any interest. Similar considerations are valid even when cs is much
higher than the risk free interest rate r. For example Table 2 shows the same
scenario as in Table 1 but for the fact that cs = 0:15. In particular V ￿ only
changes form 69:93 in the base case to 67:42. This highlights how V ￿ is hardly
26sensitive to cs.
[Table 2 about here]
V ￿ is quite insensitive also to the bankruptcy cost parameter a. V ￿ tends
to rise in assets volatility ￿, since higher volatility makes default and exercise
of avoiding powers after repayment more likely.
As expected D(V ) increases in ￿o through a rise in R(V ￿ ￿ x;￿o), since the
exercise of avoiding powers becomes more likely as the law extends the "suspect
period before bankruptcy ￿ling". This entails that the cost of borrowing from
arm￿ s length lenders is reduced as the avoid powers of bankruptcy trustees are
extended. Of course as ￿o rises so does V ￿, since equity holders anticipate
repayment.
V ￿ generally rises in the rate b at which the ￿rm generates earnings. The
default barrier Vd rises in b, thus making the exercise of avoiding powers more
likely. This prospects again "pushes" V ￿ upward.
As expected V ￿ rises with the size of the assets liquidation costs as captured
by k. The higher the k, the more costly it is to liquidate the assets, i.e. the less
"liquid" the assets are. We can think of k as either direct or indirect liquidation
costs. When k = 0 the ￿rm is probably just using cash or cash equivalents to
pay Fs, so that it need not sell any of its "assets-in-place". V ￿ is sensitive to k.
For example V ￿ = 68:83 in the base case, whereby k = 0, but V ￿ rises to 73:4
if k = 0:1.
As for the third column of Table 1, which shows ceteris paribus the values of
the various claims after repayment, it is worth highlighting that the total value
27of the claims held by equity holders after repayment E0 (V )￿R(V;￿) may well
be negative. This is clearly due to the possibility that the bankruptcy trustee
exercise avoiding powers.
Overall simulations reveal that in most cases V ￿ can be expected to be
between 120% and 200% of the face value F + Fs of total outstanding debt.
Thus repayments of equity holders￿loans not only can have material valuation
consequences, but are also quite likely events. Inter alia these considerations
seem important since equity holders￿lending is widespread among private small
and medium sized ￿rms.
We can conclude that unscrupulous equity holders, when deciding repay-
ment, do not so much face a trade-o⁄ between maximising the value of the tax
shield and minimising the risk of avoiding powers. Rather their trade-o⁄ is one
between maximising the expropriation of arm￿ s length creditors, which would
typically entail delaying repayment, and minimising the risk of avoiding powers.
As a consequence, the legislator should be aware that, in order to attenuate the
incentive for equity holders to play the "repayment-game", it should increase the
"suspect period" rather that reduce the magnitude of the tax shield associated
with equity holders￿lending.
4.3 Remedies to attenuate "repayment risk"
Now we consider possible remedies to attenuate the "repayment risk" faced by
debt holders. The most e⁄ective remedy against repayment risk seems to be a
covenant that prohibits the sale of assets. Similarly Morellec (2001) suggests
28that a pledge on the ￿rm￿ s assets may protect debt holders against the risk
of depauperation of the ￿rm￿ s assets. But a pledge can only be obtained on
￿xed assets or some current assets other than cash or cash equivalents, whose
level typically ￿ uctuates enormously over time. Thus a pledge on ￿xed or on
some current assets would not be very e⁄ective if the ￿rm had plenty of cash
with which to repay the debt due to equity holders. Moreover, whereas it
may be relatively easy to require and monitor a debt covenant that limits the
distribution of dividends, we can hardly think of a covenant that prevents the
￿rm from repaying its debt by using cash.
Assets sales restrictions do not solve the problem of creditors￿expropriation
when they induce the ￿rm to re￿nance equity holders￿debt repayment with
newly issued debt, let alone that it may be di¢ cult for the ￿rm to borrow when
assets are worth V ￿ since ￿nancial distress would be "near". Even in this case,
since repayment of Ds (V ) is at or close to par and since the fair value of Ds (V )
would be much less in the absence of repayment, other creditors would again be
expropriated.
An alternative remedy to the "repayment-game" is for arm￿ s length creditors
to impose covenants whereby the ￿rm cannot repay equity holders￿credit before
repaying the arm￿ s length creditors￿ . But such covenant may be very restrictive
for the ￿rm, although the above analysis suggests that ruling out repayment
could materially reduce the cost of borrowing.
Having shown how "repayment risk" should be a real concern to arm￿ s length
debt holders, in the following we discuss generalisations of the above analysis.
295 Generalisations of the analysis
We now discuss how the preceding results can be generalised to di⁄erent default
conditions, di⁄erent forms of equity holders￿credit and how they impact optimal
capital structure.
5.1 Renegotiation, endogenous default and avoiding pow-
ers
Past literature (e.g. Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) or Mella-Barral and Per-
raudin (1997)) has proposed structural models whereby equity holders and debt
holders renegotiate as the ￿rm approaches ￿nancial distress. Renegotiation is
intended to avert costly bankruptcy. Also in the above model we can envisage
that, after repaying the debt due to themselves, equity holders renegotiate the
￿rm￿ s remaining debt obligations with creditors as the ￿rm approaches distress.
But such renegotiation, which is subsequent to repayment, should consider the
possibility that the trustee exercise avoiding powers, which would strengthen
debt holders￿bargaining power and increase their payo⁄ in bankruptcy. Indeed
debt holders may want to accelerate bankruptcy if the deadline for exercise of
avoiding powers approaches.
On the other hand if, after repayment, equity holders could inject cash into
the ￿rm, they would tend to do so at least to temporarily stave-o⁄ default until
when the trustee￿ s right to exercise avoiding powers expires. Equity holders
may consider equity injections irrespective of any renegotiation with creditors.
30These equity injections have not been explicitly modelled in the above model,
since the default barrier would then become time dependent and scupper the
tractability of the model. Moreover equity holders may not have deep pock-
ets or may not even be cohesively willing to inject funds into the ￿rm in the
proximity of distress. Why then should they want repayment of their credit,
which is the opposite of injecting funds, in the ￿rst place? Finally at the time
of repayment the value R(V ￿;￿o) of the claim associated with avoiding powers,
which represents a potential liability for equity holders, seems a good proxy of
the present value of the cash injections that equity holders can be expected to
make to keep the ￿rm solvent. Thus its seems of second order importance to
explicitly model cash injections after repayment.
5.2 Equity holders￿credit in the form of bonds
Equity holders￿credit may simply be a loan, which the ￿rm can decide to repay
at any time. But equity holders￿credit can also be in the form of callable
bonds, which again the ￿rm can repay before maturity. In considering the case
of bonds we extend the previous analysis to a setting that is more typical for
￿rms whose stock trades in the stock market. Even controlling equity holders
or board directors of such ￿rms can play the "repayment-game" we discussed
before.
The case whereby equity holders￿credit is in the form of bonds presents
some important complications. In fact, whereas in the case of loans it is clear
that equity holders are creditors toward the ￿rm and arm￿ s length creditors can
31value their claims accordingly, in the case of bonds this may not be clear, since
it may not be possible to know who holds the bonds at any given time. This
is particularly true when bond holders can retain anonymity as is the case of
bearer bonds, which can change hands unnoticed. This lack of transparency and
the possibility that equity holders may buy a substantial part of outstanding
bonds from current bond holders pose signi￿cant pricing problems: the other
bond holders would not know whether to price bonds considering or excluding
repayment to equity holders. The pricing di⁄erence between the two cases could
be substantial as shown above. Moreover notice that equity holders may well be
willing to pay more for the bonds than the fair market price, since the bonds in
their hands would be worth more than in anybody else￿ s hands. This is because
they can expropriate other bonds holders buy deciding early repayment of the
bonds they have bought. In fact repayment of some bonds at V ￿ would amount
to the ￿rm exercising an out-of-the-money bond call option, i.e. to a gift to
bond-holders. But if the called bonds are held by equity holders, equity holders
are really making a gift to themselves. Indeed by calling the bonds at V ￿ they
are making the maximum possible gift to themselves given the amount of bonds
they have bought. Of course such is not the case if the bonds are held by others,
in which case the bond would be called at a price above rather than below the
current bond price. We have assumed one single repayment of equity holders￿
credit, but a succession of repayments are theoretically possible: we abstract
from this case for simplicity.
The policy to call the bonds at V ￿ can help explain why callable straight
32bonds are called late (see e.g. Vu (1986), Longsta⁄ and Tuckman (1994), King
and Mauer (2000)), i.e. why they are called when their market prices are higher
than their call prices. Of course such call policy presupposes that callable bonds
are at least partly owned by equity holders and that they often tend to trade
above their face value, especially when the risk of exercise of avoiding powers is
limited. In fact King and Mauer (2000) ￿nd that none of the traditional expla-
nations ￿ts the average call policy they observe for callable straight bonds. Fur-
thermore the same arguments are applicable to convertible bonds, even though
Asquith (1995) showed that convertibles are not called as late as previously
thought. As for convertible bonds owned by equity holders, conversion would
clearly rule out the risk of depauperating the company through call and repay-
ment, although conversion may take place at higher stock prices as the prospect
of repayment at V ￿ increases the value of the "straight bond" component of the
convertible.
If the bonds were neither callable nor puttable, but simply amortising, and
if the amortisation were done by randomly selecting the bonds to be repaid at
any given date, and if equity holders did not lend to the ￿rm in any other way,
then the problem of "expropriation through repayment" would disappear and
the valuation of the ￿rm￿ s liabilities would be much simpler. Indeed the market
may be willing to pay a premium for such "simplicity".
All these considerations suggest that, if a third party bond holder knew
that he was selling callable bonds to a controlling equity-holder, he could ask
a higher price than if he sold the bonds to anybody else. What has been said
33about bonds is also applicable to preferred stock. Moreover, what has been said
under the assumption that Ds (V ) belongs to equity holders is also applicable if
Ds (V ) belongs to a third party in secret agreement with equity holders. Equity
holders and this third party could agree to share the gains due to repayment.
This collusion would be particularly di¢ cult to detect.
5.3 Distribution of capital reserves
The above analysis concerns no only loans and bonds held by equity holders, but
also "capital reserves". Here by "capital reserves" we mean components of the
book value of equity other than shareholders￿capital and other than reserves
accumulated through retained pro￿t. Capital reserves are constituted by equity
holders￿injections of funds into the ￿rm, without the duty for the ￿rm to repay
such funds. Of course no interest is paid to on capital reserves. But notice
that the ￿rm can, in absence of covenants that forbid it, repay capital reserves
to equity holders. In fact what was said above for the case whereby cs = 0
is applicable also to the distributions of such "capital reserves" formed with
injections equity holders￿ s funds. Thus the whole operation of injecting funds
and repaying them can mimic an interest-free loan or interest-free callable bond
and may explain why covenants limiting dividends limit also distributions of
"capital reserves".
345.4 Dividends rather than debt repayment
It can be argued that equity holders could depauperate a distressed ￿rm by sim-
ply distributing dividends rather than by having the ￿rm repay the debt due to
themselves. But in fact there may be important limitations to distributing div-
idends. As the ￿rm approaches distress retained pro￿ts may have been eroded
by losses. Debt covenants may restrict the amount of dividend distributions
and dividends may be taxed when distributed. Distributions through reduc-
tion of share capital are subject to close scrutiny by the courts and typically
require implicit consent by creditors. Instead the repayment of debt to equity
holders o⁄ers a particularly quick and unencumbered way for equity holders to
depauperate the ￿rm. Finally, what seems particularly dangerous is that eq-
uity holders distribute dividends and ￿nance such distribution by lending to the
￿rm. This could transform equity reserves, which are junior to creditors, into
debt that is e⁄ectively senior to other debt claims, in so far as it is repaid before
bankruptcy.
5.5 Agency costs of debt
At this point it is worth mentioning that, by lending to their own ￿rm, equity
holders can generally align their interests more closely to those of arm￿ s length
creditors. The reason is that the payo⁄s to equity holders would become more
similar to the payo⁄s of other creditors. In other words equity holders￿loans
can attenuate some agency costs like assets substitution or under-investment
as studied by Jensen-Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977). But this alignment
35of interests and similarity of payo⁄s to those of arm￿ s length creditors break
down in case the loan is repaid before bankruptcy. In other words the equity
holders￿loan repayment considered in this paper entails that such loan no longer
alleviates the mentioned agency costs associated with borrowing from arm￿ s
length creditors.
5.6 Optimal capital structure
Now we consider the e⁄ect of "repayment risk" on optimal capital structure. In
fact in the previous analysis of "repayment risk" we have considered a realistic
capital structure but not an optimal one. Optimal capital structure for given
coupon rates c
F and cs
Fs respectively for D(V ) and Ds (V ) is characterised as
[F￿;F￿
s ] such that
[F￿;F￿
s ] = arg max
F;Fs;V ￿ [D(V ) + E (V ) + Ds (V )] (29)
st : V ￿ ￿ x > Vd;V ￿ > Vdd;;V ￿ ￿ V;F ￿ 0;Fs ￿ 0.
This means that, for a given F, equity holders will set F￿
s and V ￿ so as to
maximise the value of their claims E (V ) + Ds (V ) subject to the usual con-
straints listed above. By repeating this maximisation for all values of F we can
￿nd the optimal values F￿, F￿
s and V ￿. Here we abstract from possible thin-
capitalisation rules which may limit deduction of cs for corporate tax purposes
as Fs varies. Table 3 reports results using base case parameter values, with the
only di⁄erence that F, Fs and V ￿ are now di⁄erent form the base case.
36[Table 3 about here]
As expected the optimal value F￿+F￿
s implies a trade-o⁄between minimising
bankruptcy costs B (V ) and minimising the tax burden T (V ). As in the base
case we assume that k = 0 so that L(V ) = 0 for simplicity. The ￿rst column
of Table 2 shows that, when F = 1, V ￿ w Vd + x since there is hardly any risk
of avoiding powers. But when F grows the risk of avoiding powers increases so
that V ￿ > Vd + x because equity holders anticipate repayment.
The optimal capital structure is found for 20 ￿ F￿ ￿ 25: notice that in the
table E (V )+D(V )+Ds (V ) is highest (63:45) for F = 20. Table 2 reveals that,
as F rises, also the optimal values F￿
s and V ￿, which maximise E (V )+Ds (V ),
rise. V ￿ rises since higher Fs and F imply greater risk of avoiding powers: the
avoiding powers payo⁄R(Vd) = min(max(F ￿ Vd (1 ￿ a)(1 ￿ tc)(1 ￿ td);0);Fs)
increases in Fs and F. F￿
s rises with F because the more the debt the ￿rm owes
to arm￿ s length creditors, the greater the opportunity for unscrupulous equity
holders to expropriate arm￿ s length creditors through repayment. This result
highlights how optimal capital structure does not entail a direct trade-o⁄ be-
tween F￿
s and F. Of course this conclusion is mitigated by the risk of avoiding
powers, which makes repayment to expropriate other creditors less e⁄ective.
6 Bank loans and personal guarantees
The above model can also be re-interpreted and extended to analyse and price
the e⁄ect of guarantees conceded by controlling equity holders to banks that
37lend to the ￿rm. For simplicity and as a reference point, we assume that equity
holders are personally solvent even when the ￿rm defaults. In other words the
guarantee they give to the bank is itself default-free. Then we can re-interpret
the above pricing model as follows. D(V ) is the value of debt held by a bank
that has no guarantee. Then, assuming that ti = 0, we can re-write
Ds (V ) = Dsb (V ) ￿ G(V ) (30)
where




















Dsb (V ) is the value of the guaranteed bank loan, which is going to be repaid
at face value Fs when the value of the ￿rm￿ s assets equals V ￿. In the absence
of repayment before default, the loan would be repaid just at default when the
value of assets equals Vdd. In the latter case the formula for Dsb (V ) would be
the same as 31 but for the fact that Vdd would replace V ￿. Notice that Dsb (V ) is
essentially default-free in either case since either the full face value Fs is repaid
at V ￿ or it is repaid at Vdd as the shareholders guarantee that the bank can
always fully recover their credit, even in default.
G(V ) is the value of the claim associated with the loan guarantee o⁄ered
by creditors to the bank. In fact repayment e⁄ectively eliminates the risk that
the guarantee will have to be honoured, e⁄ectively liberating equity holders
38from their obligation toward the bank. In this way repayment reduced the
total pool of assets available to satisfy creditors. Hence, in case bankruptcy fol-
lows repayment within one year, according to US courts the bankruptcy trustee
could avoid repayment since repayment would then be quali￿ed as fraudulent
conveyance. For example Cullina (1991) explains this under a legal point of
view. The trustee￿ s right to avoid repayment entails a potential liability for
equity holders and such potential liability is worth G(V ) before repayment and
R(V ￿ ￿ x;￿o) at the very time of repayment.
Equation 30 suggests we can still use the model and results in the previ-
ous sections to analyse also the present setting. In particular the quali￿cation
of repayment as fraudulent conveyance protects the ￿rm￿ s other creditors and
reduced the cost of borrowing from them. Equity holders will decide to repay
the bank loan Dsb (V ) neither to early nor too late, again in order to reduce
exposure to the risk of the bankruptcy trustee￿ s avoid powers. The bank itself
may be quite indi⁄erent to repayment only if equity holders are certain to be
personally solvent even if the ￿rm they control enters bankruptcy. In drawing
these conclusions we keep assuming that the bank loan Dsb (V ) would be subor-
dinated to D(V ) in case of default. For example this can be the case if D(V ) is
a secured loan due to a second bank that is not assisted by personal guarantees
of the equity holders. Of course if the bank loan Ds (V ) was senior to D(V ) or
secured on some of the ￿rm￿ s assets the incentive for equity holders to decide
repayment before default would be much weaker, if any.
397 Conclusion
This paper has analysed the valuation of the ￿rm￿ s liabilities when equity holders
are at the same time creditors. This is a frequent phenomenon especially in
private companies and it has a material valuation e⁄ect on the ￿rm￿ s liabilities.
By anticipating repayment of their own credit before the ￿rm￿ s default, equity
holders can e⁄ectively make their credit senior to the claim of arm￿ s-length
creditors.
Possible revocation of repayment by the bankruptcy court protects arm￿ s-
length creditors, reduces the cost of borrowing and induces equity holders to
repay their credit earlier. Early repayment is generally less detrimental to arm￿ s-
length creditors. Equity holders e⁄ectively have an option to "put" their loan
bank to the ￿rm, which they do not exercise too late in order to avoid excessive
exposure to the risk of repayment revocation by the court. The tax shield due
to equity holders￿lending does not materially a⁄ect the repayment decision.
Repayment is delayed as assets volatility increases and as the time period for
the court￿ s repayment revocation is lengthened.
The analysis is applicable not only to loans due by the ￿rm to equity holders,
but also to bank loans personally guaranteed by equity holders. Moreover the
analysis is applicable to callable bonds and to callable preferred stock, whose
value to equity holders may be higher than to anybody else, since equity holders
can govern the call and repayment decision. Equity holders could buy the
callable bonds at above market prices and then get the ￿rm to call them. This
could not be done with non-callable bonds.
40The results of the paper underscore the importance of requiring that the
￿rm￿ s ￿nancial statements disclose the amount of debt due to equity holders.
Finally company law and/or the bankruptcy code should envisage that the bank-
ruptcy court be given the unconditional right to revoke at least debt repayments
to equity holders occurred one or two years before bankruptcy ￿ling. The longer
such period, the stronger the protection of arm￿ s length creditors against repay-
ment and the less the cost of borrowing.
A Appendix
A.1 The model without repayment
In case of no repayment, standard no-arbitrage arguments entail the following








V (r ￿ b) ￿ rDs + cs (1 ￿ ti) = 0 (33)
Ds (V ! 1) !
cs (1 ￿ ti)
r
, Ds (Vdd) = min(max(Vdd (1 ￿ a)(1 ￿ tc)(1 ￿ td) ￿ F);Fs)
with solution
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￿2 and Vdd = c+cs
b . Notice that Ds (Vdd)








V (r ￿ b) ￿ rD + c = 0 (35)
D(V ! 1) !
c
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, D(Vdd) = min(Vdd (1 ￿ a)(1 ￿ tc)(1 ￿ td);F)


















V (r ￿ b) ￿ rT + (V b ￿ c ￿ cs)(tc + (1 ￿ tc)td) + csti = 0 (36)
T (V ! 1) ! V (tc + (1 ￿ tc)td), T (Vdd) = Vdd (1 ￿ a)((1 ￿ tc)td + tc)
with solution
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V (r ￿ b) ￿ rB = 0 (38)
B (V ! 1) ! 0, B (V ￿) = B0 (V ￿ ￿ x)
with solution






A.2 The model with repayment









V (r ￿ b) ￿ rD + c = 0 (40)
D(V ! 1) !
c
r
, D(V ￿) = D0 (V ￿ ￿ x;￿o)








V (r ￿ b) ￿ rT + (V b ￿ c ￿ cs)(tc + (1 ￿ tc)td) + csti = 0 (41)
T (V ! 1) ! V (tc + (1 ￿ tc)td), T (V ￿) = T
0
(V ￿ ￿ x) + x(1 ￿ k)(tc + (1 ￿ tc)td)








V (r ￿ b) ￿ rB = 0 (42)
B (V ! 1) ! 0, B (V ￿) = B0 (V ￿ ￿ x)








V (r ￿ b) ￿ rL = 0 (43)
L(V ! 1) ! 0, L(V ￿) = xk
and has the solution given by equation 26.
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48No repayment
(inputs in Italic) Before repayment After repayment
a (bankruptcy costs as fraction of V d) 20% 20% 20%
r (default risk-free spot interest rate) 4% 4% 4%
 (volatility of V) 20% 20% 20%
b (assets total payout to security holders) 8% 8% 8%
 (suspect period before bankruptcy filing) 1.00 1.00
t c (corporate tax rate) 33% 33% 33%
t d (witholding tax on dividends) 12.5% 12.5% 12.5%
t i (tax on interest payments) 12.5% 12.5% 12.5%
k (coefficient for liquidation costs due to repayment) 0
C s (annual coupon, which is paid continuously) 1.3 1.3
Coupon rate: C s/F s 5.0% 5.0%
C (annual coupon, which is paid continuously) 1.3 1.3 1.3
Coupon rate: C/F 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
F s (face value of arm's length debt) 25.0 25.0
F (face value of debt) 25.0 25.0 25.0
V (assets value) before or after taxes 100.0 100.0 100.00
V* (repayment barrier) - 68.93
Vdd(default barrier without repayment) 31.25
Vd(default barrier with repayment) 15.6 15.6
x (liquidated assets) 42.6
q (endogenous constant) 0.6 - 0.6 - 0.6 -
L(V) (value of expected liquidation costs) -
L(V*) -
B(V) (value of expected bankruptcy costs) 3.3 1.9
B(V*) 2.3
B'(V) (value of bankruptcy costs after repayment) 1.1
T(V) (value of claim tax) 29.5 33.8
T(V*) 24.3
T'(V) (value of tax claim after repayment) 32.5
Ds(V) (value of equity holders' loan) 13.1 25.2
Ds(V*) 24.7
R(V,t) (claim due to avoiding powers) -
D(V) (value of arm's length debt) 22.6 17.0
D(V*) 13.7
D'(V) (value of arm's length debt after repayment) 22.8
E(V) (value of equity) 31.5 22.1
E(V*) 3.9
E'(V) (equity value after repayment) 43.5
Total liabilities 100.0 100.0 100.0
Yield spread on Ds(V): (Cs/Ds-r) 5.53% 0.97%
Yield spread on D(V): (C/D-r) 1.53% 3.34% 1.48%





























(inputs in Italic) Before repayment After repayment
a (bankruptcy costs as fraction of V d) 20% 20% 20%
r (default risk-free spot interest rate) 4% 4% 4%
 (volatility of V) 20% 20% 20%
b (assets total payout to security holders) 8% 8% 8%
 (suspect period before bankruptcy filing) 1.00 1.00
t c (corporate tax rate) 33% 33% 33%
t d (witholding tax on dividends) 12.5% 12.5% 12.5%
t i (tax on interest payments) 12.5% 12.5% 12.5%
k (coefficient for liquidation costs due to repayment) 0
C s (annual coupon, which is paid continuously) 3.8 3.8
Coupon rate: C s/F s 15.0% 15.0%
C (annual coupon, which is paid continuously) 1.3 1.3 1.3
Coupon rate: C/F 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
F s (face value of arm's length debt) 25.0 25.0
F (face value of debt) 25.0 25.0 25.0
V (assets value) before or after taxes 100.0 100.0 100.00
V* (repayment barrier) - 67.42
Vdd(default barrier without repayment) 62.50
Vd(default barrier with repayment) 15.6 15.6
x (liquidated assets) 42.6
q (endogenous constant) 0.6 - 0.6 - 0.6 -
L(V) (value of expected liquidation costs) -
L(V*) -
B(V) (value of expected bankruptcy costs) 9.6 1.9
B(V*) 2.4
B'(V) (value of bankruptcy costs after repayment) 1.1
T(V) (value of claim tax) 28.1 30.3
T(V*) 23.9
T'(V) (value of tax claim after repayment) 32.5
Ds(V) (value of equity holders' loan) 22.3 35.8
Ds(V*) 24.3
R(V,t) (claim due to avoiding powers) -
D(V) (value of arm's length debt) 26.4 17.0
D(V*) 13.5
D'(V) (value of arm's length debt after repayment) 22.8
E(V) (value of equity) 13.5 15.0
E(V*) 3.3
E'(V) (equity value after repayment) 43.5
Total liabilities 100.0 100.0 100.0
Yield spread on Ds(V): (Cs/Ds-r) 12.79% 6.48%
Yield spread on D(V): (C/D-r) 0.73% 3.35% 1.48%









































50Vd+ x (default barrier + sold assets) 46.2       50.2 54.8       59.2 63.3       67.3 71.1       74.8 78.4       78.0 78.8
V* (repayment barrier)       46.6       52.2       58.8       65.3       71.6       77.8       83.9       89.9       95.8       97.6     100.0
F (face value of D(V)) 1 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Fs (face value of Ds(V)) 27 28 28 29 30 30 31 31 31 29 28
E(V)+D(V)+Ds(V) 62.21 62.70 63.13 63.37 63.45 63.39 63.19 62.88 62.45 62.57 62.41
E(V) (equity value) 33.82 30.59 26.83 23.35 20.09 17.03 14.15 11.43 8.85 8.61 7.81
D(V) (arm's length debt value) 0.79 3.80 7.26 10.43 13.33 16.00 18.44 20.67 22.70 25.18 27.27
Ds(V) (debt value of equity holders) 27.60 28.32 29.03 29.59 30.03 30.36 30.61 30.78 30.89 28.78 27.33
Cs/Fs(coupon rate of Ds(V)) 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
C/F (coupon rate of D(V)) 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%




















Figure 1: Value of arm's length credit before repayment as a function of V and V* in the presence of avoiding powers (base ca se scenario)



















































Figure 2: Value of equity holders's loan before repayment as a function of V and V* in the presence of avoiding powers (base case scenario)
V (value of the firm's assets)
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